This study examines how stakeholders exert an influence on product design decisions in the presence of exogenous uncertainty. Hitherto, research has traditionally viewed firms as one entity, and has prescribed an "optimal" product design decision at firm level. Inspired by field studies at Nokia and Philips, our research seeks to open the "black box" of R&D organizations by comparing design outputs in various situations of decision power distribution and task priority. It studies a fundamental yet often overlooked conflict in the team: the organization's task priority and the team leader's position power (project finalization). It also quantifies two types of personal cost related with stakeholders in development teams and identifies the organizational factors which lead to project termination. Simple empirical test is used to support our insights.
Introduction
During the design stage, product attributes are usually translated into a set of specification values (Ulrich and Eppinger 2003) . The choice of product specifications has been identified as one of the fundamental decisions of new product development (NPD) (Krishnan and Ulrich 2001) . Properly defined product specification constitutes the first step in successful product design (Srinivasan et al. 1997, Kalyanaram and . In contrast, poorly defined product specification may hinder a firm's ability to incorporate customer preferences and cause delays in the new product development process (Kalyanaram and Krishnan 1997, Ulrich and Eppinger 2003) .
Even well-organized firms struggle to set "correct" product specifications (Srinivasan et al. 1997) .
A persistent challenge arises from the imprecise information provided by market research. This information is often fuzzy and inaccurate, which makes it extremely difficult to achieve objective and actionable measurement of the target value (Srinivasan et al. 1997 ).
Another challenge comes from the management of the product development team. In many firms, the product is designed by a team made up of personnel from different functional areas such as Marketing, R&D, Manufacturing, and so on (Pinto et al. 1993, Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss 2001) , each with diverse backgrounds and preferences (Atuahene-Gima and Evangelista 2000) . Despite a potential for conflicts of interest within development teams (Pelled and Adler 1994) , methods such as job rotations, communications and a collaborative culture (Pinto et al. 1993, Pelled and Adler 1994) have been found to mitigate this potential.
In practice, however, conflicts of interest persist (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995) . Indeed, they may even be beneficial for firms under certain conditions.
1 Experienced engineers typically subscribe to the view that, "A good car is always a product with a lot of conflicts and compromises" (Sobek et al. 1998) .
A third challenge arises from the combination of imprecise information and the team members' diverse backgrounds. Although they share a common goal, team members tend to make their own individual interpretations (Dougherty 1992) . For example, where a firm specifies "usability"
as the target of product design, design engineers might seek to identify a product usage, that
has not yet been articulated while overlooking the need to satisfy current consumer desires. For marketing purposes, however, usability will derive from observing customers' existing applications of a product. Each party, therefore, will propose different "optimal values" to achieve the same target.
In summary, lack of an objective and consistent definition of the design target tends to prevent different parties in development teams from taking coordinated actions (Loch et al. 2006) , which may in turn lead to a delay in the product launch or even to the termination of the project (Gerwin and Barrowman 2002) . In essence, product design decisions often become a negotiation (Bucciarelli 1994 ) between various parties involved (Atuahene-Gima and Evangelista 2000).
Unfortunately, existing literature has tended to look at product design decision at the firm level without opening the "black box" of the development team's complex internal interactions.
In the related literature, a product is viewed as "a bundle of well defined attributes" (Srinivasan et al. 1997) . The decision on the value of one attribute is thus a process of finding the best value optimizing system (product) as well as component performance in the interest of "we" (the firm) (Shi et al. 2001 , Gu et al. 2002 , Michalek et al. 2005 , while team members' individual "expected optimal value" is considered irrelevant. As the product complexity increased and more attributes were introduced, the optimization problem became mathematically more difficult to solve. Therefore, a couple of heuristics such as Greedy Search, Genetic Algorithm, and Nested
Partitions were developed and applied (Shi et al. 2001) .
Although this stream of literature has a strong desire for objective choice of product specification, there are still some fundamental limitations to objectivity due to the fuzzy borderline between what is and what is not feasible in a real decision context (Roy 2005) . In practice, many decisions made under uncertainties usually result neither from calculations in terms of joint preference function nor awareness of consistent identities, but from interactions among individuals pursuing their own interests (March 1994) . Particularly in an R&D environment, different parties will struggle to exert their departmental or personal influence on new products (Pinto et al. 1993) due to the personal risks involved in undertaking NPD projects (Atuahene-Gima and Evangelista 2000) which are linked to the organization's priorities (Loch et al. 2006) .
As a result, few managerial implications can be inferred from existing literature about what may be the most "implementable" product design in a specific organizational context. This study takes a "stakeholder management" perspective to tackle the third challenge facing managers. Research on stakeholder management under uncertainty defines stakeholders as "parties who are affected by the project, have a interest in it, and can influence it" (Loch et al. 2006 ).
Specifically, we focuses on strategic interactions between marketing and design engineers in one development team. By applying a rigorous game theoretic method, this study analyzes two important aspects of organizational design as well as the interaction between them: stakeholders' task priority and the distribution of decision power.
Viewing product design as a "continuum" of the decision-making process, the study quantifies the team leader's position power as well as stakeholders' personal interest in a development team.
In addition, it shows one fundamental conflict in the development process: the mismatch between the team leader's position power ("final say on product design") and the team member's task priority may lead to "blocking" of the design progress. The priority uncertainty can be resolved through the team member's informative "signalling" only if the team leader's power is sufficiently restricted. Organizational factors leading to project termination (delay) are also studied.
This work relates to other findings on the antecedent of a team leader's position power (Ibarra 1993, Atuahene-Gima and Evangelista 2000) , although no detailed quantitative analysis of the complex decision-making process has been conducted in these studies. Our study looks at the consequence of stakeholder influence and asks other questions: How exactly does the team leader's position power matter to the product design? How do stakeholders strategically exert their influence on product design decisions?
In this study, we capture a commonly observed characteristics of the R&D environment: stakeholders are multi-tasking and the priority of each task reflects their personal interests Loch 2003, Loch et al. 2006) . Previous studies have typically treated task priority as a "strategic" factor managed at firm level (Chao and Kavadias 2008) and it is implicitly assumed to be exogenous to a team's individual decision making. Our study makes the stakeholder's task priority endogenous with the decision making by putting termination cost on involved parties if the project is terminated.
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Task priority is closely related to other implicit incentives in R&D organizations (e.g. Siemsen (2008) , Hutchison-Krupat and Kavadias (2009) ). The parties involved in high-priority projects for the organization often incurs a much heavier career loss when negative outcomes arise than those involved in low-priority projects (Faure 2009 ). Managers might also hesitate to terminate a "bad product" for fear of being punished for the product's failure (Simester and Zhang 2009) . Therefore, the termination cost indicates the underlining importance of the focal project for stakeholders.
Previous literature on information exchange among team members tends to assume that at least one party owns some valuable "accurate" information about external uncertainty, such as market demand uncertainty (Kalyanaram and Krishnan 1997) and technology uncertainty (Bhattacharya et al. 1998 ) and highlights the importance of information acquisition and hedging , Bhattacharya et al. 1998 , Loch and Terwiesch 2005 , 2007 , whereas internal uncertainty caused by strategic interactions among stakeholders is not addressed. In contrast, we look at an R&D environment where design decisions have to be made with inaccurate information about exogenous uncertainties and none of the parties involved is certain of the "true" underlying value.
Such an environment is commonly observed in many radical innovation projects with high market and/or technology uncertainty. In such a situation, it becomes extremely difficult to apply one "objectively correct" criterion to justify one decision over another (Loch et al. 2006) . For example, in the fuel cell project at Siemens, progress was delayed many times due to a debate about the "technology target" between R&D engineers and the Accounting department ). In a survey of R&D managers, a majority of respondents regarded coordination in such an environment as an activity involving the use of power (Gandz and Murray 1980) .
Set within the framework of product developers' "negotiations" (Bucciarelli 1994, Ulrich and Eppinger 2003) , our study distinguishes itself from the broad bargaining literature in which a proposal is repeatedly offered by one party with only one-sided incomplete information.
3 Although some models do allude to alternative-offer bargaining with two-sided incomplete information (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1987, Watson 1998) , they usually discuss the equilibriums under infinite horizons with time value discount. In our model, "negotiation" is terminated under finite horizons and there is no time depreciation parameter.
In Section 2, we define three types of decision power in the design process. The baseline model is presented in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we compare design outputs under different decision processes and team leader's position power structures. Managerial implications are discussed in Section 6. Empirical evidence and pointers for future research are presented at the end of the paper.
Motivation Examples: Product Design Decisions in Nokia and Philips
Our research was inspired by comparative case studies of two multinational firms in China. The interviewees included product managers, supervising engineers and sales managers from the Hardware Development division in Nokia (China) and the Speaker Development Center of Philips (China).
Thanks to the special customer-supplier relationship between the two firms, some interviewees were familiar with the decision-making process of the other company.
Across Nokia and Philips, a junior design engineer is on average involved in three or four projects; experienced senior design engineers may be involved in up to ten projects simultaneously. In Nokia's Marketing division, people are involved in only two or three projects at most; Philips' Marketing employees can participate in as many as five projects.
One phenomenon we discovered from two companies is that team members could hardly tell how many other projects their colleagues were undertaking and how the top management split their colleagues' working hours. In addition, many team members were very reluctant to publicize their complete project portfolios to other colleagues. This is similar to the observations in other R&D contexts such as university labs and scientific institutions.
Two other commonalities were observed at Nokia and Philips. First, in both firms, most of the new product initiatives are proposed by the R&D division, i.e., by design engineers. Second, due to the prevalence of manufacturing outsourcing, both firms put an emphasis on marketing and R&D activities in Chinese markets. Procurement department offers suggestions regarding the choice of materials and component suppliers.
From our interviews, we discovered that product revision and finalization decisions were taken by different parties in Philips (China) and Nokia (China) . At Nokia, design engineers were in charge of revising product details and presenting product specifications for the final approval by the Marketing division. At Philips, design engineers usually determine the final specifications, while
Marketing simply offers revision opinions before the design was finalized. The arrows define the sequence of the decision process and the doted boxes describe the boundary of one stakeholder's dominant influence. Figure 1 represents a bi-polar influence structure under which stakeholders respectively participate in two extremes of the decision process. In contrast, Figure 2 represents an embedded influence structure in which one stakeholder participates both before and after the decision stages in which another stakeholder plays a leading role.
Stakeholder's Influences in the Product Design Process
The decision-making process can be depicted as a continuum including a sequence of decision stages (Mintzberg 1979 , Jensen 2001 , in which a stakeholder's influence is embedded. The "participation" (Saunders 1981 ) of stakeholders at different stages constitutes a source of decision power.
In organization studies, decision power is defined as the "potential ability to influence behaviour, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do" (Pfeffer 1992) . It is most frequently used under conditions of moderate interdependence (Pfeffer 1992) .
Aligned with these studies in general decision-making contexts, we specifically examine three milestone decisions in setting product specifications: initiation, revision and finalization (Ulrich and Eppinger 2003) .
Through participating in each stage, product developers manifest three types of decision power: • Initiation power is manifested by exerting an influence on establishing and proposing initial target value. The initiation of a product project might be undertaken by any functional area in a firm and is the step preceding specification revision and finalization.
• Revision power is manifested by revising and confirming the product specification initiated during the previous stage. The specification chosen at this stage may or may not be identical to the initial value. At revision stage, product developers are able to exchange project-related information such as market risk, technology risk, etc.. If overwhelming agreement is reached at this stage, the design process ends with consensus specification.
• Finalization power is the team leader's position-specific ability to decide what to do if no consensus is reached during the revision stage. Enforced finalization often creates friction between the parties involved Tabrizi 1995, Loch et al. 2006) . We call the efforts the team leader needs to spend on imposing his final say as the "coordination cost".
Conceptually, the coordination cost captures the effectiveness of the team leader's position power in the development team. 4 In reality, the coordination cost measures the ease with which the team leader can get senior management's endorsement; conversely, it might also be seen as a potential for loss of trust and relationships between team members (Loch et al. 2006) . For example, an experienced team leader usually obtains senior management's support more easily than a less experienced one. As a result, his/her coordination cost is lower than that of a junior colleague.
Model Developing
In contrast to the vertical distribution of decision power in economics (e.g. Aghion and Tirole (1997) , Athey and Roberts (2001) ) and other emerging research on NPD (e.g. Hutchison-Krupat and Kavadias (2009)), we focus on studying how the horizontal distribution of decision power influences product design. Such a way of power distribution is commonly observed in product development projects (Mintzberg 1979 , Ibarra 1993 , Mihm and Cui 2009 ).
However, generating an exhaustive list of distributions becomes challenging because any minor change in the type of stakeholder (preference) and decision process (sequence of events) might influence the decision output. One way to simplify the analysis is to focus on the dominant influence of some key stakeholders under certain decision processes. Our study focuses on strategic interactions between Marketing and design engineers, who are identified as important stakeholders involved in development teams (Griffin and Hauser 1996) , at three "basic" stages of decision making.
Image that a firm initiates a product development project. The overall project target is defined as"to maximize expected profit". Assume each unit of the new product incurs manufacturing cost c = k ρ f , which is a function of product attribute f and k > 0. Suppose f can be described in a well-ordered specification space (Terwiesch and Loch 2004 ) with feasible range [0, f ]. One example might be the "maximal resolution" of a computer monitor or "fatigue resistance level" of a bearing.
For simplicity, the specification space is taken to be single dimensional and ρ = 1. Suppose that the product design starts with one "default" specification value f 0 , which may be the attribute installed in other products in the same line or simply the industry's standard.
The product's retail price is the manufacturing cost plus a profit margin, which is a fixed ratio m of manufacturing cost with m > 0. Therefore, P = c + mc = (m + 1)kf . Let product demand function D = af − bP + ε where a > 0 and b > 0. The random term ε captures the potential market shock exogenous to the firm's decision-making process with E[ε] > 0. The market shock might be quite severe for newly developed concepts and products launched to the market (Loch and Terwiesch 2005) . Last, we assume the firm also incurs a fixed sunk cost S.
Hence, the firm's expected profit is
The firm's objective function is therefore
In feasible range
This study focuses on the latter case and the parameters are set in such a way that 0 < f * < f .
By first order condition, firm's optimal product specification value
. Note that it increases with the expected market shock.
The firm decides the project will be implement by one crossfunctional team composed of personal from both Marketing and Design and the team is authorized to decide product specifications autonomously. The goal of maximizing profit is shared by all team members and each member's performance is evaluated against identical criteria. However, team members have different expectations regarding market shock. Therefore, the utility function of party i in a development team can be defined as
where i ∈ {d, m}, ε i is the perceived market shock for party i. T 0 is each party's "baseline" benefits from being involved in the project team.
Similarly,
. f * i represents party i's expected optimal specification maximizing expected profit.
Without loss of generalizability, let
Assume each party is aware of the other party's expected optimal value through communications. However, ε is exogenous and not realized during the design stage. Hence, both parties are uncertain which optimal f * i will eventually maximizes the firm's as well as their own expected payoff. In this study, we let Marketing play the role of team leader and the product designer serve as team member. The team leader always has the final say on what should be done if no consensus is achieved by a certain time horizon (Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Gerwin and Barrowman 2002) .
Depending on what type of decision power he/she has, the team member may or may not participate in the initiation and revision stage of product design.
We model a multiple stage decision process upon a bargaining model between two parties with differing "expected optimum". Stakeholder's initiation and revision power are modelled as an offer to a counterpart, which is binding if the counter party accepts. In other words, design consensus is reached when all team members agree with a specification value.
If no consensus is reached at the revision stage, the team leader needs to evoke finalization power, which is modelled as one final offer to the team member incurring a coordination cost. If the team member accepts the leader's final decision, the design ends in consensus. Otherwise, the product design cycle is terminated with default value f 0 and both the team leader and member incur termination cost c Considering that stakeholders incur career loss only when negative project outcome arises (Faure 2009 ), we ignore the time value by letting discount parameter equal one in each decision stage.
We also abstract out the information exchange effect at the revision stage to isolate the influence stakeholders exert on product design. Therefore, the stakeholder' expected "optimal specification" remains constant through the design cycle.
Lastly, suppose that before the project starts, Marketing (team leader) believes that designer (team member) has a high termination cost with probability q 0 . After observing the designer's proposal, Marketing's updated belief is q 1 . Similarly, the designer initially believes that Marketing's termination cost is high with probability p 0 . After marketing's proposal, the designer's updated belief is p 1 . All the probabilities are nonnegative and not greater than 1.
Define for party i of type t, the set of product specifications that party i would prefer to project termination is:
, where i, j ∈ {d, m} and i = j. f t i represents the expected optimal specification value for stakeholder j from the set of specifications that stakeholder i with type t would prefer to project termination.
, the above condition becomes:
Note that when f * m ∈ Ω l d , Marketing doesn't need to care about the designer's termination cost because he/she can forcefully enforce f * m without running the risk of project termination. Therefore, when the default specification f 0 and the team leader's expected optimum f * m are fixed, the specification value is always decided at f *
, solving the constrained optimization function gives us:
Because c
, by principal of constrained optimization, we must have:
. When marketing knows the designer's priority, the best specification value the designer can propose that deters marketing from enforcing finalization power is defined asf The condition is equivalent to:
Product Specification Decisions under Non-restrictive Finalization Power
In this section, we examine how the distribution of initiation and revision power affects the design outputs when the team leader's finalization power is not restricted (e = 0). Organizations of this type are usually characterized by a "heavyweight" team leader with credible experience (Clark and Fujimoto 1991) or a corporate culture where the team leader's autonomy is highly respected (Loch et al. 2006) .
When e = 0, we can see thatf
Since there is no cost for Marketing to enforce specification finalization, the best value the designer can achieve is no better than Marketing's offer at the last stage. Marketing's finalization power eventually serves as a "threat" to constrain the designer's aggressive proposal upfront. We conclude that under non-restrictive finalization power, the specification value is decided at f t d if the team leader is certain about the team member's priority t. Design consensus is always achieved without the risk of project termination. Lemma 1. When e = 0 and q 0 ∈ {0, 1}, marketing (team leader)'s expected payoff is E[u m (f
The risk of project termination is zero.
Bi-Polar Decision Model
In a bi-polar model, the team leader (Marketing) and the team member (designer) exert their influences at "two poles" of one continuous decision process. The sequence of events is shown in Figure 5 . Before proceeding to the analysis of the complex decision process described in Figure 5 , we start with the simple case where Marketing (team leader) is a single decision maker and exerts dominant control over the entire design process. In this case, the designer only serves as a decision "follower".
Marketing directly proposes specification value f * to the designer and he/she chooses to reject or accept.
, it is always optimal for the team leader to let the project terminate. This purpose can be served by enforcing any f * < f 
Observe that
is increasing in c t m . We can therefore define two threshold variables critical for the following analysis:
Clearly, β > α.
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Depending on initial belief q 0 and termination cost c First, looking at the rows, the project has the highest chance of termination when both Marketing and designer have a low termination cost. In this case, the only chance of design consensus is reached when the team leader also believes that the team member's priority is low (q 0 ≤ α). Second, looking at the columns, the project is most likely to be terminated when the team leader puts a high estimation on the team member's task priority, which makes the team leader aggressively impose finalization power to approach his/her preferred specification value.
Marketing's Priority Designer's Priority
Third, α constitutes a critical value of the team leader's belief below which the project is never terminated. Therefore, we could use α as a parameter to measure the project stability. The value of α depends on the team leader's expected payoff with f t d and default specification f 0 as well as termination cost for the team leader of low priority. As we can see, α ≈ 1 when c l m → ∞. This implies that as the team leader's task priority gets sufficiently high, the project bears zero risk of termination.
Under the single decision maker model, the team leader has no information about the team member's task priority when the final decision is imposed. If the team leader acts too aggressively, the termination cost may be incurred with positive probability -a "bad" outcome which both the team leader and the member wish to avoid. Due to the priority uncertainty, even a team leader of full decision power without restrictions cannot enforce his own optimal value f * m . Therefore, the team member's privacy of task priority protects his interest from being completely exploited by team leader's position power, at the risk of potential project termination.
Once we extend the analysis to two stages where the team member gets the chance to offer a proposal before the team leader's final decision, a puzzle intuitively arises: Is there any chance that the team member might be willing to reveal his priority by offering a specification value that the team leader would rather accept than run the risk of project termination? In this way, design coordination is improved, hence α increases compared with the previous scenario.
Note that each stakeholder i is only aware of his own project termination cost. The information about the other party j's c t j , is "incomplete" for party i.
We observe two points about z t . First, z t is a specification value, that if accepted by Marketing of type t, gives him at least the same utility that he would receive from taking his own optimal design decision. Second, z t optimizes the designer's utility given the acceptable specification set by Marketing. If the designer proposes any f 1 > z t , marketing of type t will reject and enforce a worse f 2 for the designer. Hence, z t is the designer's best proposal that prevents Marketing from enforcing the final decision.
Next, we show a useful lemma.
Recall Lemma 1 that product specification would be f l d if Marketing is certain that the designer is assigned with low project priority. Lemma 2 shows that when Marketing's updated belief regarding the designer's priority is below critical threshold α, the design outcome is similar to that with complete information.
Before going into a detailed analysis, we check the lower bound of stakeholders' expected payoffs in a bi-polar decision model. Lemma 3. In a bi-polar decision model, when e = 0 and q 0 ∈ (0, 1), marketing's expected payoff
Lemma 4. In a bi-polar decision model, when e = 0 and q 0 ∈ (0, 1), low-priority designer's expected payoff is at least
One corollary immediately follows: Corollary 1. In a bi-polar decision model, when e = 0, low-priority designer always proposes
Depending on the team leader's initial belief structure, different equilibria exist: Proposition 1. (pooling equilibrium) If q 0 ≤ α, the following strategies and belief constitute a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
In this equilibrium, the designer's proposal is always f where, per Marketing's request, the R&D division started to improve the phones' user interface in order to benchmark local competitors. At the same time, the R&D division was also involved in a hardware development project assigned by global headquarters. As a result, only two junior engineers were assigned to this project. This project came in time but "We gave up a lot of plans", as one interviewee from Marketing stressed.
Proposition 2. (designer pooling, marketing separating equilibrium) If α < q 0 ≤ β, the following strategies and belief constitute a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
In this equilibrium, similar to what we observe in Proposition 1, the designer initiates the pro-
However, Marketing's initial belief is greater than threshold α. Therefore, low-priority Marketing acts more aggressively by declining f This equilibrium describes the situation in which the team leader has a reasonable estimation of the team member's task priority. In this case, the team leader's action depends on his own task priority. This situation is observed in most of projects we investigated at Nokia and Philips.
Proposition 3. (designer semi-separating, marketing pooling equilibrium) If q 0 > β, the following strategies and belief constitute a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
In this equilibrium, the team leader believes that the focal project is of critical importance for the team member. In such a situation, Marketing, regardless of its own task priority, acts aggressively and imposes a specification value only a designer of high priority would accept. A low-priority designer proposes f l d because that is the best value for marketing from the designer's acceptable set. In the face of Marketing's aggression, a high-priority designer will protect himself in a mixed strategy by creating positive chance of mimicking a low-priority designer.
Compared with the equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2, this equilibrium bears the highest risk of termination, stemming from the mismatch between the team leader's judgment on the team member's priority and the team member's true task priority. This mismatch propels the team leader to act over-aggressively and creates a lot of friction leading to project termination.
Comparing design outputs in a single decision-maker model (summarized in Table 1 ) and a bipolar decision model, we find that both the product specification values and risk of termination are identical. This implies that under the management of non-restrictive team leadership, the information advantage informed stakeholder (designer) is willing to give up is not strong enough to substitute for dominant stakeholder (marketing)'s position power. Hence, design coordination is not improved by letting the team member participate in the stages before design finalization.
Embedded Decision Model with More Design Iterations
In an embedded decision model the team leader exerts a dominant influence on both the project initiation and the finalization stage. The team member participates in the revision stage and his influence is constrained in the "middle" stage of the design process. One interesting question to explore is: How could a team leader take advantage of the additional chance of exerting influence compared to a bi-polar model? Does the risk of project termination change? The sequence of events is described in Figure 6 . The analysis of each equilibrium is quite complex. While a detailed analysis of the three cases is included in the Appendix, 6 we briefly explain the intuition here.
In Model Two, Marketing needs to determine two actions: to initiate a proposal and make a final offer. Compared with Model One, where Marketing decides only one action, Marketing's expected payoff cannot be worse, because it can at least "pool" its actions f 1 without releasing any additional information. On the other hand, the expected payoff for the designer in Model Two cannot be worse than Model One either because he/she can always reject Marketing's initial proposal f 1 and get the equilibrium design outputs in Model One. On balance, the design outputs (specification value and risk of project termination) do not change across the two models.
We therefore conclude that Proposition 4. Under fixed non-restrictive finalization power, redistribution of initiation and revision power do not change the equilibrium design outputs in terms of specification value and risk of project termination.
The risk of project termination increases with the team leader's initial estimation about the team member's task priority.
Product Specification Decisions under Restrictive Finalization Power
The above analysis shows that under non-restrictive finalization power, design coordination cannot be improved by redistributing initiation and revision power. In this section, we restrict the team leader's finalization power in Model One (coordination cost e > 0) and study how it affects design outputs.
With positive coordination cost, equilibria are not unique. However, some interesting equilibria can be found and we compare them with those when e = 0.
Proposition 5. (pooling equilibrium)
Let z ∈ (max{f
, the following strategies and belief constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium :
In this equilibrium, variable γ is the critical threshold below which a consensus decision is always made. Clearly, γ increases with e and γ > α when e > 0. This implies that keeping other factors equal, project stability decreases with the team leader's position power. In addition, the consensus specification z is strictly greater than f l d , the consensus value decided under non-restrictive finalization power. In the following, a conclusion can be drawn.
Proposition 6. As the team leader's finalization power reduces (coordination cost e increases), the project has greater chance of having a consensus decision without project termination and the consensus specification becomes more favorable for the team member.
Under non-restrictive finalization power, the team leader always enforces his finalization power and no effective "signalling" of each other's task priority can be expected. In such a situation, the design outputs are sensitive to the team leader's initial belief. Observed from Proposition 5, the sensitivity deteriorates as team leader's finalization power shrinks (project stability α increases). This implies that, when the team leader's position power is restricted to a certain level, we might find a belief-proof equilibrium where design coordination is achieved solely through effective signalling.
Proposition 7. (designer separating equilibrium)
Given any sufficiently large coordination cost
, the following strategies and belief constitute a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium :
In this equilibrium, any proposal from the designer of task priority i will reveal his true task priority and the risk of termination is reduced to zero. The team leader's optimal strategy is "pooling" regardless of his own termination cost. When the project is of high priority for the team member, the product specification is decided atf 
Discussion and Managerial Implications
According to the above analysis, when the team member involves sufficiently strong interest in the
, the project runs no risk of termination and the specification is always decided to be f * m . Conversely, when the project is of no critical importance for both the team member and the team leader (c
, the project always ends with the default value f 0 . Interestingly, when the project is of high importance for the team leader while relatively less critical for the team member (c Table 2 summarizes the findings. In rows, {i, j} where i, j ∈ {H, L} represents the task priority of Marketing (leader) and designer (member), respectively. In columns, the first scenario is the case where the team leader is fully aware of the team member's task priority under non-restrictive position power. The second column is the case with priority uncertainty under nonrestrictive position power. The last column on the right represents the coordinative design outputs under restrictive position power (e is sufficiently large).
Priority Transparency
Non-restrictive Power Restrictive Power With exogenous uncertainties, the managerial method the firm should undertake will depend on how senior management at firm level judges random shock's "true" underlying expectation value.
We illustrate this point by a simple example.
Assume that the exogenous market shock is binomially distributed with two potential realiza-
In this case, a firm's expected optimal specification f * should be a linear combination of two stakeholders' optimal values. The closer f * gets to the team leader's preference (f * m ), the more the firm should make priority transparent. At extreme, the firm should make team member's task priority sufficiently high. When f * approaches the team member's preference (f * d ), the firm should take measures to restrict the team leader's influence.
In many organizations, stakeholders' task priorities on focal projects are given: They are decided "strategically" at firm or business unit level (Chao and Kavadias 2008) . In those environments, when the team member (designer)'s priority is high, the most effective way of implementing the team leader's wish is to make the priority transparent. Conversely, when team member's priority is low, keeping task priority invisible and increasing the leader's position power best serves the interests of the team leader.
By contrast, Table 2 also shows that in any situation, restricting the team leader (marketing)'s position power yields the highest specification value. In other words, restricting the team leader's control over design finalization is the most effective way of achieving product design against the team leader's wishes.
The analysis from this study predicts that under non-restrictive position power, the project bears a higher chance of project termination (therefore a delay) when the team leader believes that the project is of high priority for the team member (Table 1) . From the interviews at Nokia and Philips, we collate simple empirical evidence to test this hypothesis.
In total, 14 interviewees cited 17 projects, all of which were managed by senior project managers with at least seven years product development experience. Interviewees self-reported whether the project was delayed compared with the original plan. We used an open-end semi-structured questionnaire and the questions about project output (delay) did not immediately follow the questions on evaluation of the team member's priority. This method reduced potential respondent bias (Weisberg 2005) . The priority evaluation was categorized as either "high" or "low". A simple 2 × 2 contingency analysis is shown in the following Among seven delayed projects, the team leaders put a "high" value on team member's priority in five projects. The conditional probability of "delay" given high evaluation is therefore 5 7 or 71.4%, which is over 50%. We apply Fisher's test (the alternative to a chi-square test when the number of observations in the cells is small and unequally distributed): The null hypothesis that a delayed project has an equal chance of occurring among high and low priority estimations by team leaders is rejected with a one-tailed significance of 0.05.
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The results from this study also offer new angels from which to examine some previous empirical findings. For example, a powerful team leader ("heavyweight") can normally help ease internal friction (Clark and Fujimoto 1991) , "maintain a disciplinary vision" (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995) thus shorten development time. However, when the team leader's position power is operationally measured as his final say regarding product design, resource allocation, etc., no significant linkage between team leader's power and development time was found (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995) .
Our study offers one contingent prediction to this empirical puzzle: When the team member's task priority is high, the powerful team leader indeed facilitates product development (no project termination). This echoes an observation by Toyota that its engineers (team member) are usually involved in only one project and that their future career is closely connected with the success of that product (Clark and Fujimoto 1991) . Conversely, when the team member's task priority is low (high level of multi-tasking), a powerful leader may even hinder the product design. In this case, a "less-powerful" team leader might be a better choice, as observed in many IT company contexts.
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In conclusion, our study takes a stakeholder management perspective to examine the product specification decision. Other than the uncertainties external to organizations, we highlight the importance of the organizations' internal uncertainty (task priority) for product design.
Our findings show that under non-restrictive position power, redistribution of initiation and revision power does not change design outputs. The project is never terminated when the team member or leader's interest involved is sufficiently strong, or when the task priority is transparent, or when the team member's task priority is high under non-restrictive position power, or when the team leader's position power is sufficiently restricted.
On the other hand, with a powerful team leader, the project has the highest chance of termination when the focal project is of low importance for both parties, or the team leader overestimates the task priority the team member has truly assigned.
The uncertainty of task priority influences the specification decision in two respects. On the positive side, priority uncertainty mitigates the ability of the team leader to extract concessions from team members, in which case, a "balanced" product specification may be achieved. It also offers an organizational tool for firms to internally direct rather than eliminate conflicting product designs facing exogenous uncertainty. On the negative side, priority uncertainty may slow down the development process, leading to the delay of the product launch.
This implies that an ideal "product reorientation" can only happen when position power, priority transparency, and the dominant stakeholder's belief are moved in the same direction. For example, when a firm wants to make the product design more "customer-oriented", distributing the finalization power to Marketing 10 is the first policy option. However, if the design engineer is assigned a low task priority or Marketing behaves over-aggressively after being empowered, the risk of project termination may increase. As a remedy to this, making priority transparent is essential.
The analysis in this study is built upon three "component decisions" in one design cycle. In reality, the design of new products may extend across multiple periods composed of many design cycles. The distribution of decision power as well as the stakeholder's task priority may even change from one cycle to another. However, the analysis of a single design cycle constitutes an initial step toward our understanding of the complex design process with multiple cycles.
The organization's internal factors such as decision power and task priority -which are key to our analysis -serve to overcome the shortcomings of the existing literature, in which the firm is considered to be a unified and consistent entity. They also may then play a valuable role in the broader research agenda that seeks to understand the unique structure of R&D organizations, which enables them to grow and be competitive in the product market.
We therefore begin by ensuring that designer will not deviate from proposing f1 * t = f Next, we check the optimality of marketing's strategy η * t . As before, we take two steps: first check the optimality on equilibrium path and second check the out-of-equilibrium optimality.
First
Step: Given other equilibriums and belief structures, marketing of either type is better off by accepting any f 2 < f 1 . When high-type marketing proposes f 
